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Criminal Codification and General Principles
of Criminal Law in Argentina, Mexico,
Chile, and the United States:
A Comparative Study
EDMUND H. SCHWENK*
Most fields of law have been open to development and ad-
justment, whereas criminal law is inflexible by virtue of its very
nature. The common law "rule of strict interpretation" seems to
obstruct progress of any kind.' The field of criminal law needs
more legislative attention than any other; but unfortunately it
has received only secondary consideration. Legislatures do not
always seem to realize that a criminal indictment involves the
right to liberty and life, as distinguished from a civil suit which
usually affects the pocket book of the losing party. An awakened
public interest in criminal law is likely to stimulate more legis-
lation in this field in the near future than has been the case in
the past.
Comparative study is an important preliminary step in any
adequate modern legislation, 2 and the criminal law of foreign
countries should be considered. For us, the Latin-American
countries are of particular importance. Since it is impossible to
deal with all of them, this study is devoted to three: Argentina,
Mexico, and Chile. The criminal law of all three countries is
codified.3 Each code is divided into a general and a special part.
*J.U.D., University of Breslau, LL.M., Tulane University. Holder of
Brandeis Fellowship at Harvard Law School; author of various legal articles
abroad and In this country. The writer is indebted to Professor wex S. Ma-
lone for some valuable suggestions.
1. Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes (1935) 48 Harv.
L. Rev. 748.
2. Cohn, Task and Organization of Comparative Jurisprudence (1939) 51
Jurid. Rev. 134; Kuhn, Function of the Comparative Method in Legal History
and Philosophy (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 350.
3. Criminal Code of Argentina, October 29, 1921; Criminal Code of Mexico,
August 14, 1931 (in effect since September 17, 1931); Criminal Code of Chile,
November 12, 1874.
The Criminal Code of Argentina Is the result of thorough preliminary
work. It is based upon (1) the projet of Dr. Carlos Tejedor, (2) the projet of
1891, (3) the projet of 1906, and (4) the projet of 1917. Special attention was
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The general part states the general principles of. criminal law
relating to jurisdiction, concept of crime, circumstances which
exclude the criminal responsibility, attempted crime, participa-
tion in the commission of a crime, merger, continuing crime,
recidivists and habitual criminals, penalties, and circumstances
which extinguish responsibility. The special part of each code
defines specific offenses.
1. JURISDICTION
In the field of criminal law the term jurisdiction is used in
two different ways: jurisdiction of the sovereign and jurisdic-
tion of the courts.4 The latter term refers more properly to mat-
ters of venue, and the present consideration is limited to the
jurisdiction of the sovereign which involves two problems.
The first problem deals with the scope of jurisdiction. How
far may a sovereign exercise the right to punish? Since juris-
diction is an incident of sovereignty, and sovereignty means
power, the logical answer should be that the sovereign has the
right to punish all persons within the sphere of his power. How-
ever, this jurisdiction is subject to a limitation which has been
expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States as fol-
lows:
"the general and almost universal rule is that the char-
given to the European codes and drafts (Draft of Germany, 1909; Draft of
Austria, 1909; Draft of Sweden, 1916; Draft of Switzerland, 1916). See Diaz,
El Codigo Penal Para La Republica Argentina (1928) 37, no. 67; 1 Malagar-
riga, Codigo Penal Argentina (1927) no. VII; I Moreno, Codigo Penal (1922)
56, 74, 87, 95, 96.
The Criminal Code of Mexico was drafted upon the following principles
established by the Commission for the Draft of a New Criminal Code: (1)
amplification of judicial discretion within the constitutional limits, (2) avoid-
ance of details within the same limits, (3) individualization of the penal
sanctions (i.e., shifting from punishment to protection of society), (4) effec-
tiveness of the right to recover damages, (5) simplification of the procedure.
See Zabre, Codigo Penal (1936) 9.
The Criminal Code of Chile was drafted in 1870 after two previous at-
tempts in 1846 and 1856. Originally, the Criminal Code of Belgium was sug-
gested as a model of the draft. However, Alejandre Reyes, a member of the
commission for the draft, opposed the plan on the ground that the Criminal
Code of Spain was a more proper model than that of other countries. See
Lazo, Codigo Penal (1916) XI, XII.
4. Jurisdiction of the sovereign means the right of a state or country to
punish. Its scope depends upon international and constitutional law. Jurisdic-
tion of the courts means the right of a particular court to hear and determine
a particular case. It is a matter of statutory procedure. Jurisdiction of the
sovereign may exist without jurisdiction of the courts, but jurisdiction of the
courts cannot exist without jurisdiction of the sovereign. See Standard
Stocker Co., Inc. v. Lower, 46 F.(2d) 678, 683 (D.Md. 1931); Paige v. Sinclair,
237 Mass. 482, 130 N.E. 177 (1921). Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Terri-
torial Principle (1931) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 238; Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes
(1925) 16 J. Crim. L. 316, 319; Hegler, Principien des Internationalen Stra-
frechts (1906) 140; Stimson, Conflict of Criminal Laws (1936) 1 et seq.
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acter of an act as lawful or unlawful must be deter-
mined wholly by the law of the country where the act
in done."5
This leads to the second problem. When is a crime within
the area of a sovereign? Three viewpoints are possible. The de-
cisive factor may be the place where the criminal acts of the ac-
cused took place (territorial commission theory), or where they
took effect (territorial effect theory), or both places (territorial
security theory).
At common law only those crimes are subject to the juris-
diction of the state which have been committed within its boun-
daries.6 This rule has been so strictly applied that the full faith
and credit clause of the Federal Constitution is said to be inap-
plicable in order to execute a foreign judgment of criminal na-
ture.7 A crime has been perpetrated within the state if the crim-
inal acts took place in the state.8 Thus, the common law adheres
to the territorial commission theory and rejects the territorial
effect theory as well as the territorial security theory. This
seems to be due to the fact that only the presence of the crim-
inal within the state at the time of the crime confers jurisdic-
tion upon the sovereign.9 As a result, difficulties have arisen in
those instances in which the criminal act merely took effect
within the state. The device of constructive presence was re-
sorted to in order to justify the jurisdiction of the state.10 The
5. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356, 29 S.Ct. 511,
512, 53 L.Ed. 826, 832, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047, 1048 (1909). See also Hall, The Sub-
stantive Law of Crimes-1887-1936 (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 640; Berge,
supra note 4, at 238; Levitt, supra note 4, at 495.
6. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892);
People v. McDonald, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 702, 76 P. (2d) 121 (1938); State v.
Volpe, 113 Conn. 288, 155 Atl. 223, 76 A.L.R. 1083 (1931); People v. Hillman,
246 N.Y. 467, 159 N.E. 400 (1927); State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602, 28
L.R.A. 59, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822 (1894). Levitt, supra note 4, at 324-329; Perkins,
Parties to a Crime (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 609.
7. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892);
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Nichols, 264 U.S. 348, 44 S.Ct. 353, 68 L.Ed. 720
(1924); James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 47 S.Ct.
308, 71 L.Ed. 569 (1927). See Comment (1914) 1 Va. L. Rev. 390; Note (1927)
25 Mich. L. Rev. 903; A.L.I., Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws
(1934) §§ 444, 611. See also Barry, Comity (1926) 12 Va. L. Rev. 353.
8. Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413, 19 Am. Rep. 739 (1875); State v. Kelly,
76 Me. 331, 49 Am. Rep. 620 (1884); People v. Devine, 185 Mich. 50, 151 N.W.
646 (1915); State v. Kief, 12 Mont. 92, 29 Pac. 654, 15 L.R.A. 722 (1892); State v.
Cutshall, 110 N.C. 538, 15 S.E. 261, 16 L.R.A. 130 (1892); State v. Hall, 114 N.C.
909, 19 S.E. 602, 28 L.R.A. 59, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822 (1894).
9. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984, 22 L.R.A. 248, 44 Am. St. Rep.
75 (1893); Ex Parte Kuhns, 36 Nev. 487, 137 Pac. 83, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 507
(1913). Levitt, supra note 4, at 321.
10. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.
Cas. 1914A 614 (1912); State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. Dec. 452 (1856);
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state of New York has gone even further by statutory enact-
ment.1
The Criminal Code of Argentina provides that all crimes
shall be punished if either the commission or the effect took
place within the territory of Argentina 1 2 thereby adopting the
territorial security theory and recognizing that the territorial
commission theory is inadequate to protect persons and property
within the state.3 The code goes even further and covers agents
and employees of Argentine authorities if they commit a crime
abroad in the exercise of their duties. This is due to the fact that
many agents and employees enjoy immunity abroad and would
not be punishable at all if the scope of criminal jurisdiction were
not enlarged.'4 However, the code provision comprises even em-
ployees and agents who are not immune, such as consuls.15 On
the other hand, the immunity is limited to those crimes which
have been committed in the exercise of their duties, although it
attaches to all crimes.' 6
The Mexican code likewise provides that the commission of
Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984, 22 L.R.A. 248, 44 Am. St. Rep. 75
(1893); People v. Adams, 3 Denio 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468 (N.Y. 1846). Levitt,
supra note 4, at 321.
11. N.Y. Penal Code (Gilbert's Ann. Crim. Code & Penal Law, 1941) §
1930 reads:
"The following persons are liable to punishment within the state:
"(2) A person who commits without the state any offense which, if com-
mitted within the state, would be larceny under the laws of the state, and is
afterward found, with any of the property stolen or feloniously appropriated
within this state;
"(3) A person who, being without the state, causes, procures, aids, or
abets another to commit a crime within the state;
"(4) A person who, being out of this state, abducts or kidnaps by force
or fraud, any person contrary to the laws of the place where such act is
committed, and brings, sends or conveys such person within the limits of this
state, and is afterwards found therein;
"(5) A person who, being out of the state and with intent to cause within
it a result contrary to the laws of this state does an act which in its natural
and usual course results in an act or effect contrary to its law. See also, N.Y.
Penal Code, Section 1047 (dwelling out of state), Section 1301 (bringing stolen
goods into the state, larceny), Section 1933 (punishment of act committed
out of state)."
12. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 1. See also Diaz, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 49, no. 101; Jofre, El Codigo Penal de 1922 (1922) 31-34; 1 Malagarriga, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 66, Art. 1, no. 7; 1 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 223-250,
nos. 103-119.
13. Jofre, op. cit. supra note 12, at 31; 1 Malagarriga, op. cit. supra note
3, at 49, no. 101; 1 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 223, no. 103.
14. Ibid.
15. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 1, provides that all crimes committed
within the territory of the nation or on places subject to its jurisdiction are
punishable, as well as those which take effect there. In addition, the code is
applicable to crimes committed abroad by agents or employees of Argentine
authorities in the exercise of their duties.
16. Wilson, On International Law (1939) 177, § 65.
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the criminal act as well as its effect confers jurisdiction." How-
ever, the general scope of jurisdiction is partly restricted and
partly extended. Not all crimes committed on board a foreign
vessel anchoring in a national port or territorial water are pun-
ishable.18 On the other hand, jurisdiction extends to all crimes
committed in Mexican embassies and legacies, if they have not
been adjudicated in the country where they were committed."9
It further extends to those crimes which were committed abroad
if either the perpetrator or the injured was a Mexican citizen. 20
Chile generally follows the territorial commission principle
of jurisdiction without restriction or extension. 2'
The modern criminal law of the United States tends to enlarge
the scope of jurisdiction in spite of the fact that the actual power
of the sovereign cannot exceed the territorial limits, 22 and that
17. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 2, provides that all crimes committed
within the jurisdiction of Mexico are punishable. Crimes are also punishable,
if they have been prepared, begun or committed abroad. In the latter case,
however, only if they take effect or are intended to take effect, or are con-
tinued, within the national territory.
18. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 5, provides that crimes committed
aboard a foreign vessel anchoring in a national port or in a territorial water
are subject to the Mexican jurisdiction only if the public peace has been
disturbed or if the delinquent or the injured did not belong to the crew of
the vessel.
19. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 5, provides that all crimes committed
in Mexican embassies and legacies are punishable. However, crimes com-
mitted in Mexican consulates or against its personnel are subject to punish-
ment only if they have not been adjudicated in the country where they were
committed.
20. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 4, provides that a crime is subject to
the Mexican jurisdiction if committed abroad by a national against a national
or foreigner, or by a foreigner against a national, provided that (1) the ac-
cused is domiciled within the national boundaries, (2) the crime has not been
definitely adjudicated where it was committed, and (3) the act is punishable
according to the law of the place where it was perpetrated as well as accord-
ing to the Mexican law.
21. Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 5, provides that the penal law is applic-
able to all inhabitants of the Republic including foreigners, and that crimes
committed within its territory or the adjacent sea are subject to its jurisdic-
tion.
Article 6 provides that crimes committed abroad by Chileans or foreigners
shall not be punished except in certain cases expressly enumerated in the
code. The exceptional cases are contained in Art. 106 (inducement of a foreign
country to declare war), and Art. 174 (falsification of shares, bonds of munic-
ipal corporations, or coupons). See Fernandez, Codigo Penal de la Republica
de Chile (1899) 71, art. 6; Lazo, op. cit. supra note 3, at 25, 26.
22. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 31 S.Ct. 558, 55 L.Ed. 735 (1911). Note
(1926) 42 A.L.R. 272.
It is well settled that a nation has the power to prohibit and punish acts
by its own citizens while they are in a foreign state or country if the legis-
lature sees fit to do so. In England, a statute punishes the murder of one
British subject by another, though committed abroad. See 9 Geo. IV, c. 31,
§ 7, and Rex v. Sawyer, Russ & Ry. 294, 168 Eng. Reprint 810 (1815); Reg v.
Azzopardi, 1 Car. & K. 203, 175 Eng. Reprint 176 (1843), affirmed 2 Mood. 289,
169 Eng. Reprint 115 (1843). See also United States v. Dawson, 15 U.S. 467, 14
L.Ed. 775 (1853).
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some constitutional doubt must be removed, as far as the fed-
eral government is concerned. 23 There are many grounds which
make the extension of jurisdiction desirable, if not necessary.
The state has a definite interest in the welfare as well as in the
conduct of its citizens living abroad. Furthermore, the political
security of the state may be affected by certain crimes commit-
ted abroad. Finally, a crime perpetrated abroad may jeopardize
the economic structure of the state.24 The federal government
has not hesitated to extend its criminal jurisdiction to certain
crimes committed abroad and thus to shift from the territorial
commission theory to a liberal territorial security theory.25
II. CONCEPT OF CRIME
A determination of the concept of crime is not merely of
academic importance. It becomes important in connection with
contempt of court,26 the full faith and credit clause,27 the ex post
facto clause,2 and with equity powers.29 At common law, crime
23. U.S. Const. Amend. VI provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law. (Italics
supplied.)
It has been held that the Sixth Amendment does not prevent the United
States Government from enacting criminal laws operative abroad. See United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922). See also Note
(1916) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 194.
24. It seems to be unnecessary to limit the extraterritorial jurisdiction to
those crimes which are committed by citizens or against citizens. It may be
extended to those crimes which "immediately affect national interest." If, for
example, United States banknotes should be forged abroad by foreigners, the
United States Government would have a definite interest in punishing the
perpetrators, although they were foreigners.
See also Hall, supra note 5, at 640, 641; Levitt, supra note 4, at 495; United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936).
25. Acts by United States citizens committed abroad are punishable if
they involve certain correspondence with a foreign government. 35 Stat. 1088
(1909), 18 U.S.C.A. § 5 (1927). Acts by United States citizens or by foreigners
committed abroad are punishable if they involve perjury or subornation of
perjury before consular and other officers of the United States. U.S. Rev.
Stat. § 1750 (1878), 22 U.S.C.A. § 131 (1927).
26. If a contempt is criminal, the President may exercise his power to
pardon crimes. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 45 S.Ct. 332, 69 L.Ed. 527, 38
A.L.R. 131 (1925).
27. The full faith and credit clause has no effect in regard to crime. See
note 7, supra.
28. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9(3), prohibits the United States Government
from passing ex post facto laws, and Art. I, § 10, addresses the same prohibi-
tion to the states. It has been held that the ex post facto law clause refers
only to crimes. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). Hence, it is
important to determine whether a wrong constitutes a crime or merely a tort.
See Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution (1922) 20 Mich. L. Rev. 315;
McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States
(1927) 15 Calif. L. Rev. 269.
29. It has been held to be not permissible to enjoin a person from com-
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has been defined as any act or omission which is forbidden by
law, to which a punishment is annexed, and which the state
prosecutes in its own name.30 Pursuant to this definition, it is
said that a crime consists of two elements, the objective and the
subjective elements.31 It is submitted that this analysis is not
complete. If a person intentionally kills another in self-defense,
he certainly consummates the objective element of the crime of
murder as well as the subjective element. Yet he is free of punish-
ment. Why? It seems that a third element must be included in the
definition of crime, namely, the illegality of the objective elements.
The objective elements are illegal if they are not justifiable.
They are justifiable in case of self-defense, defense of others,
consent,3 2 and public and domestic authority 33 Hence it is sug-
gested that a crime is composed of the following elements: (1)
mitting a crime, since prosecution of the crime constitutes an adequate
remedy and the accused cannot be deprived indirectly of his right to trial by
jury. People v. Prouty, 262 Ill. 218, 104 N.E. 387, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1140, Ann.
Cas. 1915B 115 (1914); Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371
(N.Y. 1817). See, however, Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n
of Texas, 10 S.W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), commented upon in (1928)
42 Harv. L. Rev. 693, (1929) 7 Tex. L. Rev. 638, noted in (1929) 27 Mich. L.
Rev. 833.
On account of the fact that the courts declined to issue an injunction to
enjoin a person from committing a crime, statutes were enacted to give relief
by means of injunction. However, their constitutionality was doubted on the
ground that the United States Constitution provides for trial by jury if a
crime is involved. In Hedden v. Hand, 90 N.J. Eq. 583, 107 At. 285, 5 A.L.R.
1463 (1919), the legislation was held to be unconstitutional. The opposite re-
sult was reached in Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55, 5 L.R.A. 193,
14 Am. St. Rep. 446 (1889), and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31
L.Ed. 205 (1887). See also Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 50
Harv. L. Rev. 171, 226, 227.
30. United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S, 677, 12 S.Ct. 764, 36 L.Ed. 591 (1892);
Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49 L.Ed. 99, 1 Ann. Cas. 585
(1904); Mossew v. United States, 266 Fed. 18, 11 A.L.R. 1261 (C.C.A. 2d, 1920).
See Note (1900) 78 Am. St. Rep. 235.
31. Reg v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168, 1 Hale P.C. 474 (1889); Gordon v. State,
52 Ala. 308, 23 Am. Rep. 575 (1875); Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93
N.E. 249, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 467, 20 Ann. Cas. 1152 (1910); People v. Welch, 71
Mich. 548, 39 N.W. 747, 1 L.R.A. 385 (1888); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 139 Pa.
247, 21 Atl. 10, 11 L.R.A. 530, 23 Am. St. Rep. 182 (1891).
32. Consent is of legal effect only in those crimes in which either want of
consent is an element of the crime or the crime does not violate a public
interest. See Beale, Consent in the Criminal Law (1895) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 317;
Beale, The Borderland of Larceny (1892) 6 Harv. L. Rev. 244; Grayson, The
Law as to Consent When Pleaded as a Defense to Certain Crimes Against the
Person (1903) 51 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 467; Puttkammer, Consent in Criminal
Assault (1925) 19 Ill. L. Rev. 617.
33. Public authority and domestic authority seem also to exclude the ille-
gality of the act. On the other hand, mistake of fact and of law (as far as
recognized, see note 32), insanity, drunkenness, compulsion, coercion, exclude
merely the culpability, i.e., mens rea. It is doubtful whether necessity and
command of a superior to an inferior (if recognized) belong to the first or
second group. See Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law (1941) 89
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 561.
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an act or omission, (2) illegality of the act or omission (that
is, non-existence of legal justification) ,' 4 (3) culpability, 5 (4)
punishability (which may be excluded by certain personal cir-
cumstances, such as immunity of ambassadors, legislators, and
so forth). It has been said that the voluntary nature of the crim-
inal act is another element of the concept of crime." This, how-
ever, seems to be an unnecessary requirement since the absence
of volition-such as compulsion-excludes mens rea2 7
In view of the suggested analysis of the concept of crime,
the definitions in the criminal codes of Argentina, Mexico, and
Chile are extremely narrow.88 However, they are sufficient to
serve the purpose for which they were included in the codes.
That purpose was to prevent the punishment of a person who
has not committed an act or omission previously prohibited by
law. 9 To give not only statutory, but also constitutional em-
phasis to this guarantee, the Constitution of Argentina provides
that no inhabitant can be punished without conviction based
upon a law that existed before the prosecution began. It also
prohibits trial before a special commission or before a special
judge ("special criminal court") .41 Finally, it concludes that
such private acts which merely offend the public order or morale
84. Illegality of the act or omission is excluded by self-defense, defense of
others, consent, public or domestic authority.
35. It has been said that "public welfare offenses" do not require mens
rea. See Hall, supra note 33, at 568, 569; Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law
and Mena Rea (1941) 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 641; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses
(1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 55.
The same theory was suggested for the German criminal law, but was
rejected by the Supreme Court. See 2 RGSt 321 (1880), 21 RGSt 259 (1891), 29
RGSt 73 (1896). See also Ebermayer, Lobe, and Rosenberg, Das Reichs-
Strafgesetzbuch (1922) 257, § 59, no. 13; Frank, Das Strafgesetzbuch fAir das
Deutsche Reich (1926) 189, § 59, X.
36. Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 1, provides that a crime is a voluntary
action or omission for which the law imposes punishment.
37. This is, however, not true of the common law insofar as it does not
fully recognize compulsion as a defense. It is plain that the recognition of
compulsion results from the concept of mens rea. On the defense of com-
pulsion, see note 76, infra.
38. The Criminal Code of Argentina does not contain any definition of
"crime"; the Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 7, provides that a crime is an act
or omission which is punishable; the Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 1, provides
that a crime is any voluntary act or omission for which the law imposes pun-
ishment. On account of the Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 1, it has been held
that suicide and attempted suicide are not crimes, nor does bestiality constitute
a crime. Appellate Court of Iquique, April 10, 1897 (I Gac. de los Tribunales
(1897) 488, § 798), and May 8, 1899 (I Gac. de los Trib. (1899) 524, § 609). See
also Court de Casacion, October 6, 1909 (2 Gac. de los Trib. (1909) 231, § 836).
39. 1 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 128, nr. 46.
40. 1 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 128-131, nr. 46. Argentina Const.,
Art. 18.
41. Ibid.
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shall not be prosecuted, but are reserved to God, and that no-
body shall be either compelled to do anything that the law does
not prescribe or to omit anything that it does not forbid.
4 2
III. MENS REA
At common law there is no single concept of mens rea that
is applicable to all crimes. 43 For some crimes a specific intent is
required, as in larceny, where. there must be an intent to take
property known to belong to another. The most general signifi-
cance of mens rea that is found in common law crimes is illus-
trated by the rule that a reasonable mistake of fact will be a de-
fense if, on the facts as the defendant believed them to be, his
act would have been lawful. Nevertheless, in many statutory
crimes this defense is not allowed.44 The codes under examina-
tion use a general concept of criminal intent and negligence, al-
though in particular instances they may depart from it.
In the criminal law of Argentina, mens rea generally means
actual intent.45 However, there are some crimes which may be
committed negligently or imprudently.4 No definition of intent
or negligence is given .4 7 The Mexican code likewise distinguishes
between crimes committed intentionally and those committed
negligently.48 It enumerates certain circumstances which never
exclude the existence of the criminal intent and thus admits a
conclusion of what is meant by intent.1" It provides that intent
42. 1 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 128, nr. 46. Argentina Const., Art. 19.
43. LUvitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea (1922) 17 Ill. L. Rev.
117; L~vitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea (1923) 17 Ill.
L. Rev. 578; Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 905;
Sayre, Mens Rea (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974; Sayre, The Present Signification
of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, Harvard Legal Essays (1934); Stroud,
Mens Rea (1914) c. I: Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common
Law (1936) 6 Camb. L. J. 31.
44. See Sayre, loc. cit. supra note 35.
45. Diaz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 68-71, nr. 150-154; Jofre, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 85-89, Art. 34; 1 Malagarriga, op. cit. supra note 3, at 201-203, Art.
34, nr. 2; 2 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 217, no. 173.
46. They are provided for in the Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 84
(homicide) and Art. 94 (mayhem). See Diaz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 152; 3
Moreno, at 395, nr. 273; 4 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 52, nr. 38.
47. Ibid. It has been said that the enumeration of those circumstances
which exclude criminal responsibility admits an inference of what is meant
by criminal intent.
48. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 8.
49. Id. at Art. 9 provides that criminal intent must not be denied, because
(1) the accused did not intend to injure a definite person; (2) he did not
intend to cause injury, although the injury was the necessary and notorious
result of his act or he should have foreseen that It would be the ordinary
result of his act or omission or he decided to violate the law regardless of
the consequences; (3) he believed that the purpose of his act was legitimate;
(4) he believed that the law was unjust or It was morally permitted him to
violate it; (5) he erred about the person or object on whom or which he
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will be presumed, until rebutted-"
The Chilean Criminal Code recognizes the distinction be-
tween intentional and negligent crimes, 51 yet it does not define
intent or negligence. 52
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXCLUDE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
In the common law of crimes no special distinction is made
between circumstances which exclude the illegality of the act or
omission and those which merely exclude mens rea. For exam-
ple, regardless of whether the defense is one of justification such
as self-defense or prevention of a felony, or whether it is one of
lack of mental responsibility such as insanity or infancy,55 it is
usually referred to in a general manner as a matter of defense.
Yet the distinction has been made.5 4 Besides, it has legal import-
ance in other jurisdictions.55 The fact that self-defense is not ad-
missible against self-defense is based on the general idea that the
assailed acted legally when he resorted to self-defense, and against
a legal act no plea of self-defense lies.5 6
The Criminal Codes of Argentina, Mexico, and Chile do not
recognize the distinction between circumstances which exclude
the illegality of the act and those which exclude mens rea. All
the grounds which "exclude the criminal responsibility" are
enumerated in one section.5 7 Insanity, compulsion, self-defense,
intended to commit the crime; (6) he acted with the consent of the injured in
a case where the consent is immaterial.
50. Id. at Art. 9.
51. Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 2, provides that "deliets" are committed
with intent or malice, whereas "quasi delicts" are committed negligently. The
"delicts" are subdivided into "crimes," "simple delicts," and "misdemeanors"
according to the penal sanction. Art. 4, provides that "quasi delicts" are sub-
ject to the subdivision, whenever the code prescribes their punishment.
52. However, the concept of dolo and malicia as well as culpa were in-
terpreted by the courts. See Corte de Apelaciones Serena, March 22, 1876
(Gac. 1876, p. 184, § 3, 380); Corte de Apelaciones Tacna, Sept. 26, 1905 (Gac.
1905, t. 1, p. 1099, § 709); Corte de Casacion, July 28, 1910 (Rev. 7, § 1, p. 454);
Corte Suprema, March 19, 1907 (Gac. 1907, t. 1, p. 41, § 30) Corte de Casacion,
January 10, 1910 (Gac. 1910, t. 1, p. 945, § 550).
53. Cf. Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes (4 ed. 1940) §§ 64-71 (justifica-
tion), 73-96 (responsibility).
54. Schwenk, Criminal Codification and General Principles of Criminal
Law in Germany and the United States-A Comparative Study (1941) 15
Tulane L. Rev. 541, 557.
55. Schwenk, supra note 54, at 557.
56. State v. Parker, 106 Mo. 217, 17 S.W. 180 (1891), holds that one who is
himself the aggressor will not be excused for killing his adversary in self-
defense. This seems to be the logical result of the fact that his adversary
acted in self-defense and, therefore, legitimately. Consequently, he cannot
exercise self-defense against a legitimate act (namely self-defense of his
adversary).
57. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 34, exempts seven groups of persons
from criminal responsibility: (1) a person who is not able to comprehend the
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criminality of the act or to direct his action regardless of whether the reason
is the insufficiency of his mind or its morbid character, or the unconscious-
ness or excusable error of ignorance of facts; (2) a person who is compelled
by physical and irresistible force or threats to suffer a grave and imminent
injury; (3) a person who causes an injury in order to escape another immi-
nent injury which is greater than that which has been caused; (4) a person
who acts in compliance with a duty or in the legal exercise of his right,
authority or charge; (5) a person who acts by virtue of a legal duty; (6) a
person who acts in his own defense or in the defense of his rights under the
following circumstances: (a) illegal attack, (b) reasonable means to prevent
or repel the attack, (c) absence of provocation. There is a presumption of the
existence of these prerequisites if the attack takes place during the night and
within the home of the attacked no matter which injury has been inflicted
upon the aggressor; (7) a person who acts indefense of the person or rights
of another, provided that the circumstances (a) and (b) of the number (6)
exist and the third person has not participated in the provocation of the
aggressor.
Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 15, enumerates the following circumstances
which exclude criminal responsibility: (1) that the accused was compelled by
a physical, extraneous and irresistible force; (2) that at the time the crime
was committed the accused was in a state of unconsciousness caused by acci-
dental or involuntary use of substances of toxic, intoxicating or enervating
chafacter or that he was in. a state of involuntary mental disturbance of
pathological character; (3) that the accused acted in defense of his person,
his honor or his goods, or of the person, honor or goods of another in re-
pelling an actual, violent and illegal attack which resulted in an imminent
danger. (However, this defense does not exist, if (a) the attacked provoked
the aggression in giving sufficient and immediate cause to it, (b) he foresaw
the aggression and could easily have avoided it by the use of other legal
means, (c) it was not necessary to resort to the means actually used, (d)
the injury inflicted by the aggressor was easily reparable by the use of legal
means or was of notoriously little importance in comparison with the injury
caused as the result of the defense. It will be presumed that the prerequisites
for the exercise of the defense exist); (4) that grave fright or well founded
and irresistible fear of an imminent and grave injury exists or that in view
of an actual, grave and imminent danger it is deemed necessary to save the
own person and property or the person or property of another, unless there
are other means which are equally effective and less harmful. (This defense
is not available if a person is legally bound to endure such a peril by virtue
of his employment or duty); (5) that the act was committed in compliance
with a duty or in the exercise of a legal right; (6) that an act was committed
which is not punishable without the existence of certain circumstances con-
cerning the injured provided that the accused did not know of their existence
without any fault at the time, when he committed the crime; (7) that the
accused obeyed a legitimate superior, although his mandate constituted a
crime, provided that this was not notorious or known by the accused; (8)
that the accused violated a penal law prescribing an affirmative act, but was
prevented from acting on account of a legitimate reason; (9) that the ac-
cused concealed a criminal or his gain or instruments or prevented from find-
ing them, provided that it was not done in his own behalf, that no criminal
means were used and that he acted in behalf of; (10) that the accused caused
an injury as a result of a mere accident, without any intent or negligence and
in the commission of a legal act carried out with all necessary precautions.
Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 10, enumerates thirteen circumstances which
exclude criminal responsibility: (1) insanity; (2) minority under ten years;
(3) minority between ten and sixteen years, unless it is established that the
minor acted with an understanding of the act; (4) defense of one's own per-
son or rights; (5) defense of the person or rights of the spouse, of the legiti-
mate consanguineous relative in the whole direct line and collateral line; (6)
defense of the person or rights of a stranger provided that the accused has
not been induced by vengeance or any other illegitimate motive; (7) neces-
sity, i.e., the doing of an act which causes damage to the property of another
in order to avoid an evil, if the following circumstances exist: (a) actual or
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defense of others, necessity, exercise of a legal right or duty are
considered as defenses by all of the codes.'8 Self-defense and de-
fense of others are set forth in some detail. Illegal attack by the
injured, reasonable means of defense and absence of provocation
are the general requisites for the exercise of both of them. 5 It
seems to be a particular feature of the South American criminal
law that these requisites will be presumed in the event that the
defense is exercised during the night and within the home, in-
closure, or walls of the person attacked.60 It is another charac-
teristic of the South American codes that self-defense and de-
fense of others may be exercised not only for the protection of
life and bodily integrity, but also for the protection of property.6'
Adequate protection of property by the criminal law requires
not only the punishment of crimes directed against the unlawful
taking away or destroying of property (such as larceny and
arson), but also the right to avert them by self-defense. At com-
mon law, a man may not protect property by means which en-
danger life, unless the perpetrator seeks to accomplish his pur-
pose by means of a felony involving violence or surprise.62
The Criminal Codes of Argentina and Mexico permit de-
fense by others under the same circumstances under which self-
defense is allowed. The Criminal Code of Chile provides that
only persons related to the assailed have the same right of de-
fense; however, others may also have it if they are not induced
"by an illegitimate motive.""8
The Criminal Code of Mexico precludes the right of self-
imminent danger of the evil which is to be avoided, (b) that the evil which is
avoided is greater than that done, (c) that there are no other means which
are practicable and less harmful in order to avoid it; (8) the causing of an
injury through mere accident in the exercise of a legal act; (9) the commis-
sion of a crime in the exercise of a duty or in the legal use of a right, au-
thority, office or charge; (10) the commission of a crime as a result of irre-
sistible force or irresistible fear; (11) if the husband surprises his wife in the
commission of adultery and kills, wounds or maltreats her complice, or vice
versa; (12) the omission of an act on account of a legal or irresistible cause;
(13) the commission of a quasi delict except in the cases expressly provided.
58. See note 57, supra.
59. Criminal Code of Argentine, Art. 34(6); Criminal Code of Mexico, Art.
15(3); Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 10(4). See supra note 57.
60. Ibid.
61. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 34(6) (defense of his rights); Crim-
inal Code of Mexico, Art. 15(3) (defense of his person, honor or goods);
Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 10(4) (defense of one's own person or rights).
See supra note 57.
62. It has been held that homicide is not justifiable to prevent larceny.
Reg v. Murphy, Craw. & D. 20 (Ireland, 1839); Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329
(1882); State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 83 Am. Dec. 159 (1863); Grigsby v. Com-
monwealth, 151 Ky. 496, 152 S.W. 580 (1913).
63. Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 10(4), (5). See supra note 57.
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defense when other legal means are available to avoid the ag-
gression, or when the inflicted injury was easily reparable by
resort to legal remedies or was of little importance compared
with the injury caused as the result of the defense. 4 It seems to
be doubtful whether these restrictions on self-defense are advis-
able. The risk of the attack should be borne by the assailant
rather than by the assailed. For this reason, the possibility of
flight should not exclude the right to self-defense. 5 In many
jurisdictions the opposite result at common law"6 hurts human
dignity.67 The rule applied by these jurisdictions has been thus
expressed:
"We may not feel always like retreating in the face of
an attack; it may not seem manly to us; but it is the
law that if a man can safely retreat, and thereby escape
a conflict with another, he must do so, even though it
may not seem dig[n]ified and manly. 6
The South American codes are also faced with the problem
of defining the circumstances which preclude free determination
of criminal will. In the Mexican code, mens rea is expressly ex-
cluded by drunkenness, whether voluntary or involuntary. The
broad language in the codes of Argentina and Chile would seem
to lead to the same effect;"6 but in the interpretation of these
codes a distinction has been made between voluntary and invol-
untary drunkenness. 7 1
64. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 15(3) (d). See note 57.
65. 2 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 303, nr. 225; Diaz, op. cit. supra note
3, at 79, no. 66. In Chile, it has been held that it is unreasonable to do bodily
harm to a drunken person in exercise of self-defense, if it would have been
possible to flee or to repel the attack by use of the arms. Corte de Apelaciones
Valparaiso, Nov. 29, 1893 (Gac. 1893, t. 3, p. 527, § 4377).
66. Many courts have held that the person assaulted must retreat in all
cases, if he can safely do so, though the attack upon him may be felonious
and though he may, himself, be free from fault. Brewer v. State, 160 Ala. 66,
49 So. 336 (1909); State v. Donelly, 69 Iowa 705, 27 N.W. 369 (1886). See also
Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault (1903) 16 Harv. L. Rev. 567.
67. In Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 200, 23 Am. Rep. 733, 740 (1876), it
was said: "a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to flee from an
assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do
him enormous bodily harm." See also Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 15
S.Ct. 962, 39 L.Ed. 1086 (1894). Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 53, at
352, 353, § 280.
68. People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 242, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (1914).
69. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 15(2). See note 57, supra.
70. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 34(1), and Criminal Code of Chile,
Art. 10(1).. See note 57, supra. See also 2 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 252,
253, no. 187. For Chile, see Corte de Apelaciones Concepcion, Dec. 26, 1888
(Gac. 1888, t. 2, p. 1323, § 3383).
71. 2 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 252, 253, no. 187. Corte de Apela-
clones Valparaiso, July 8, 1896 (Gac. 1896, t. 1, p. 1108, § 1635); Corte de
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At common law, ignorance and mistake have been brought
under the formula that they exclude culpability if they relate to
facts, but not if they relate to law.7 2 It has recently been pointed
out that this formula is too narrow.73 It might be of some help to
subdivide the error of law into error of criminal law and other
than criminal law, for example, private or constitutional law. It
is then submitted that the error of other than criminal law ex-
cludes mens rea in the same way as the error of fact does.
In the Criminal Code of Argentina, the effect of error and
ignorance is clearly stated.7 4 It is provided that error or ignor-
ance of facts excludes the criminal responsibility if it is excus-
able. The Mexican Criminal Code enumerates a number of er-
rors which do not exclude mens rea.7 5 The code of Chile leaves
the problem to judicial determination.
At common law it seems that the concepts of compulsion,
duress, and coercion are not quite consistent with the essence of
mens rea. Too little emphasis is given to the concept of com-
pulsion, and too much to that of coercion.7 6 Some states have
abolished the presumption that a wife acts under coercion if her
husband is present at the time of the criminal act.7 7 Others pro-
vide for a less severe punishment, even where the wife commit-
ted the crime at the "command" or "persuasion" of her hus-
band.7 1 In the Criminal Codes of Argentina, Mexico, and Chile,
Apelaciones Santiago, July 27, 1897 (Gac. 1897, t. 1, p. 1269, § 1973); Corte de
Apelaciones Serena, April 24, 1899 (Gac. 1899, t. 1, p. 781, § 923).
72. Hall and Seligman, op. cit. supra note 35, at 641; Hall, op. cit. supra
note 35, at 549; Kohler, Ignorance or Mistake of Law as a Defense in Crim-
inal Cases (1936) 40 Dick. L. Rev. 113; Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in
Criminal Law (1939) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 35; Stumberg, Mistake of Law in
Texas Criminal Cases (1937) 15 Tex. L. Rev. 287.
73. Hall and Seligman, op. cit. supra note 35, at 641 et seq.; Hall, supra
note 5, at 646.
74. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 34(1). See note 57, supra.
75. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 9. See note 49, supra.
76. Threats of injury to property will not excuse the crime. It has been
so held in M'Growther's Case, Fost. 13, 168 Eng. Reprint 8 (1746); Respublica
v. McCarty, 2 U.S. 86, 1 L.Ed. 300 (1781).
Threats of injury to the person are a sufficient excuse only if they give
rise to reasonable apprehension of instant death or serious bodily harm. Shan-
non v. United States, 76 F.(2d) 490 (C.C.A. 10th, 1935); Moore v. State, 23 Ala.
App. 432, 127 So. 796 (1929); People v. Sanders, 82 Cal. App. 778, 256 Pac.
251 (1927); Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939); State v. Clay, 220
Iowa 1191, 264 N.W. 77 (1935); People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 180 N.W. 418
(1920); State v. Weston, 109 Ore. 19, 219 Pac. 180 (1923). See also Hitchler,
Duress as a Defense in Criminal Cases (1917) 4 Va. L. Rev. 519; Perkins,
Parties to a Crime (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 582, n. 9; Perkins, The Doctrine
of Coercion (1934) 19 Iowa L. Rev. 507; and Notes (1895) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 430,
(1920) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 89.
77. See, e.g., New York Penal Code (Gilbert's Ann. Crim. Code and Penal
Law) § 1092.
78. See, e.g., Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §§43-114 which excepts from criminal
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compulsion is recognized as a ground which excludes criminal
responsibility. In Argentina and Mexico, the plea of compulsion
is a good defense if physical force has been exercised or if the
accused has been threatened with an imminent and grave injury
to his person or property; in Chile, even hunger or mere fear re-
moves the criminal responsibility.
7 9
The plea of necessity as a defense is one of the most doubt-
ful devices, not only as to its existence, but also as to its scope.
The recognition of necessity as a defense means that the life,
bodily integrity, or property of an innocent person may be de-
stroyed to save the life, integrity, or property of another. Yet,
since the impulse for self-preservation is deeply rooted in human
beings, it has been advocated that necessity should be recog-
nized as a defense even at common law." However, except in a
few cases, the courts have declined to do so."
The Criminal Codes of Argentina, Mexico, and Chile have
given elaborate consideration to the conditions under which the
plea of necessity is a good legal defense.82
V. ATTEMPTED CRIME
The doctrine of attempt involves three major problems:
(1) the determination of the borderline between prep-
aration and attempt;
liability married women (except for felonies) acting under the threats, com-
mand or coercion of their husbands; Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1937) § 26.
Texas Ann. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1936) art. 32 provides: "A married woman
who commits an offense by the command or persuasion of her husband, shall
in no case be punished with death, but may be imprisoned for life or for a
term of years, according to the nature of the crime; and in cases not capital
she shall receive only one-half the punishment to which she would be other-
wise liable."
79. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 34(2); Criminal Code of Mexico, Art.
15(4). See note 57, supra. For Chile, see Corte Suprema, November 26, 1877
(Gac. 1877, p. 1727, § 3430); Corte Suprema, May 13, 1882 (Gac. 1882, p. 475, §
586).
80. See The Diana, 74 U.S. 354, 19 L.Ed. 165 (1868); United States v.
Holmes, Fed. Cas. No. 15,383 (C.C.E.D. Pa., 1842). On the other hand, see Reg
v. Dudley, 15 Cox C.C. 624, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884); Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145,
78 S.W. 773 (1904). See also Davies, The Law and Abortion and Necessity
(1938) 2 Mod. L. Rev. 126; Durand, Abortion: Medical Aspects of Rex v.
Bourne (1938) 2 Mod. L. Rev. 236; Gass, The Effectiveness of Abortion Legis-
lation in Six Countries (1938) 2 Mod. L. Rev. 97; Tolnai, Abortion and the
Law (1939) 148 The Nation 424; Comment (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 71; Note
(1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 87.
81. United States v. Ashton, Fed. Cas. No. 14,470 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834);
Commonwealth v. Knox, 6 Mass. 76 (1809); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 99 Mass.
434 (1868). See Perkins, supra note 76, at 582, n. 8.
82. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 34(3); Criminal Code of Mexico, Art.
15(4); Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 10(7). See note 57, supra.
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(2) the treatment of an attempt to commit a crime
(a) either with ineffective means, or
(b) with effective means, but upon an object on
which even otherwise effective means could
have no effect, or
(c) with ineffective means as well as upon an ob-
ject on which even effective means could have
no effect;
(3) the legal significance of a withdrawal from the at-
tempt to commit a crime.
The dividing line between preparation and attempt is
vague. 3 According to one theory, the accused must have actu-
ally carried out the first objective element of the crime in order
to enter the stage of attempt. 4 Another theory suggests that it
is sufficient for the commission of a criminal attempt if the act
is closely related to the first objective element of the crime.85 A
third theory uses the test of whether or not the act done in-
volves a danger for the person or goods at whom or at which the
crime is aimed.86 There are general statutory. definitions of at-
tempt to commit crime in the states of New York, Montana,
Utah, and Washington; but there is no explicit statutory pro-
vision in the remaining forty-four states." The Criminal Code of
Argentina defines attempt "as the beginning of the commission
of the crime."'8 8 The Criminal Code of Chile provides that there
83. Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction (1930)
40 Yale L. J. 53; Beale, Criminal Attempts (1903) 16 Harr. L. Rev. 491; Hall,
Criminal Attempt-A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability (1941) 49
Yale L. J. 789; Sayre, Criminal Attempts (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821; Skilton,
The Requisite Act in a Criminal Attempt (1937) 3 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 308.
84. It is generally agreed that this theory is too narrow. See Glover v.
Commonwealth, 86 Va. 382, 10 S.E. 420 (1889); Reg v. Cheeseman, Le. & Ca.
140, 169 Eng. Reprint 1337 (1862).
85. United States v. Stephens, 12 Fed. 52 (C.C.D. Ore. 1882); People v.
Murray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859); People v. Miller, 2 Cal. (2d) 527, 42 P. (2d) 308,
98 A.L.R. 913 (1935); State v. Lung, 21 Nev. 209, 28 P. 235, 37 Am. St. Rep.
505 (1891). In all these cases the accused was acquitted, since there was no
close relationship to the first objective element.
86. It seems that there is no substantial difference between the second
and third theory. The third theory, however, seems to furnish the clearest
test.
87. New York Penal Code (Gilbert's Ann. Crim. Code and Penal Law,
1941) § 2, provides: "Attempt to commit a crime. An act done with intent
to commit a crime, and tending but failing to effect its commission, is 'an
attempt to commit that crime.'" Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Anderson & Mc-
Farland, 1935) § 11590; Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § 103-1-29; Wash. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 2264. As to the remaining 44 states, see
Michael and Wechsler, Criminal Law and its Administration (1940) 584,
n. 3, 4.
88. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 42.
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is an attempt to commit a crime, if (1) either the accused did
everything necessary to consummate the crime, although the
effect is still lacking, or (2) if he carried out his intent by direct
acts, although one or more of the objective elements are not yet
effected.89
The problem which is presented by the "impossible attempt
to commit a crime" has arisen in the common law"0 as well as
the civil law.9 1 The distinction between absolute and relative
impossibility has evidently influenced the common law courts.92
The Draft of the Criminal Code Commission seems to present a
workable solution of the problem. 3 The Criminal Code of Ar-
gentina leaves the punishment of an "impossible attempt" to the
discretion of the trial court.94 The codes of Mexico and Chile are
silent on that problem.
The effect of a withdrawal from the attempt to commit a
crime is a matter of criminal policy. If voluntary withdrawal is
an exemption from punishment, the perpetrator may be moti-
vated to desist from the completion of the crime; if, however,
voluntary withdrawal from the attempt has no legal effect, he
89. Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 7.
90. Strahorn, Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts (1930) 78 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 962; Skilton, supra note 83; Skilton, the Mental Element in a
Criminal Attempt (1937) 3 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 181; and Note (1937) 17 B. U. L.
Rev. 421.
91. Schwenk, supra note 54, at 559.
92. If there is nothing in the house, drawer or pocket that can be stolen,
the impossibility is merely relative. Hence, the perpetrator is punishable.
State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 59 Mass.
365 (1850); Commonwealth v. Cline, 213 Mass. 225, 100 N.E. 358 (1913); People
v. Jones, 46 Mich. 441, 9 N.W. 486 (1881). The same 'is true, if the dose of
poison is too small to cause the death of one person [State v. Glover, 27 S.C.
602, 4 S.E. 564 (1888)], or if the drug is unsuccessfully administered to pro-
duce abortion [Hunter v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. Rep. 61, 41 S.W. 602 (1897)]. On
the other hand, where the impossibility is absolute, there is not even a pun-
ishable attempt at a crime. Nicholson v. State, 97 Ga. 672, 25 S.E. 360 (1896);
People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 263 (1906); Foster
v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 31 S.E. 503, 42 L.R.A. 589, 70 Am. St. Rep. 846
(1898).
93. Draft Code, § 74, reads: "Every one who, believing that a certain
state of facts exists, does or omits an act, the doing or omitting of which
would, if that state of facts existed, be an attempt to commit an offense,
attempts to commit that offense, although its commission in the manner pro-
posed was, by reason of the non-existence of that state of facts at the time of
the act or omission, impossible." Report of Criminal Code Bill Commission:-
The Draft Code (1879) 77. See also Cyprus Criminal Code (Order in Council,
1928, Gov. Print. Office: Nicosia) (1928) § 354.
94. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 44(2), provides that "if the crime Is
impossible the punishment shall be decreased to a half and may be reduced
to the legal minimum or less according to the degree of dangerousness re-
vealed by the delinquent." See also Diaz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 109, 227;
Jofre, supra note 11, at 110, Art. 44; 1 Malagarriga, op. cit. supra note 3, at
310, Art. 44, no. 2; 2 Moreno, op. cit. supra note 3, at 413, no. 286.
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may as well complete the crime. The purpose of prevention
seems to be more desirable than that of punishment for the at-
tempt. Yet the common law provides for punishment of the at-
tempt, although the perpetrator voluntarily abandons his evil
purpose.95 In Argentina and Mexico, an attempt to commit a
crime is not punishable if the perpetrator voluntarily desists
from the completion of the crimef 6 However, the older code of
Chile provides for the punishment of attempt even though the
perpetrator voluntarily withdrew from itY
7
VI. PARTICIPATION IN A CRIME
A classification of those who participate in the commission
of a crime should depend on the degree to which they further it.
However, the classification in the common law between princi-
pals of the first and the second degree and between accessories
before and after the fact is not based on that ground. Further-
more, it has been said that the common law observes no distinc-
tion of essence between principals of the first and second de-
gree" and that the distinction between principals and accesso-
ries before the fact is wholly a matter of judicial construction
and is purely technical.9 9 Finally, it seems that the accessory
after the fact is not a participant at all. The crime has already
been completed when he goes into action. Statutory enactments
by Congress as well as by several states have taken these con-
siderations into account.1°0 It is submitted that de lege ferenda
three groups of participants should be distinguished according to
95. State v. McCarty, 115 Kan. 583, 224 Pac. 44 (1924); People v. Marrs,
125 Mich. 376, 84 N.W. 284 (1900); Commonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108,
118 Atl. 24 (1922); Glover v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 382, 10 S.E. 420 (1889).
96. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 43; Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 12.
97. Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 7.
98. State v. Woodworth, 121 N. J. Law 78, 1 A.(2d) 254 (1938); State v.
Whitt, 113 N.C. 715, 720, 18 S.E. 715, 719 (1893); State v. Allison, 200 N.C. 190,
156 S.E. 547 (1931). See also Perkins, supra note 76, at 594-601; Sears, Princi-
pals and Accessories-Some Modern Problems (1931) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 845.
99. State v. Poynier, 36 La. Ann. 572 (1884); State v. Rodosta, 173 La. 623,
138 So. 124 (1931). See also Perkins, supra note 98, at 594 et seq.
100. 35 Stat. 1152 (1909), 18 U.S.C.A. § 550 (1927) reads: "'Principals' de-
fined. Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in
any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
or procures its commission, is a principal." 35 Stat. 1152 (1909) 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 551 (1927) reads: "Punishment of accessories. Whoever, except as other-
wise expressly provided by law, being an accessory after the fact to the com-
mission of any offense defined in any law of the United States, shall be im-
prisoned not exceeding one-half the longest term of imprisonment, or fined
not exceeding one-half the largest fine prescribed for the punishment of the
principal, or both, if the principal is punishable by both fine and imprison-
ment; or if the principal is punishable by death, then an accessory shall be
imprisoned not more than ten years." See also Ga. Code (Park et al., 1935),
tit. 26, §§ 26-501, 26-502, 26-601, 26-606; New York Penal Law (Gilbert's Ann.
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the degree to which they further the commission of the crime,
namely, those persons who actually perpetrate the crime regard-
less of whether they are present or absent, those who success-
fully instigate the crime, and those who assist the perpetrator in
the commission of the crime. Unsuccessful instigation-called
solicitation at common law-constitutes a misdemeanor, even
though the perpetrator tried to solicit another to commit murder
or treason. 1" This classification seems to be inadequate to the
gravity of the criminal act.
The Criminal Code of Argentina provides the same penalty
for the instigator as is imposed upon the perpetrator. It pro-
vides, however, a like punishment for the person without whose
help the perpetrator would not have been able to commit the
crime.10 2 On the other hand, the Mexican Criminal Code pro-
vides that all the participants shall be punished alike.' The
Criminal Code of Chile distinguishes between perpetrator, ac-
complice, and concealor. 04° All three codes leave open the prob-
lems of "necessary participation in a crime,"'' 0 5 of excessus man-
dati, and of agent provocateur.0 6
Crim. Code & Penal Law, 1941), §§ 2, 26, 27, 1934. See also Michael and
Wechsler, op. cit. supra note 87; Orfield, Effect of Statute Providing for
Similar Prosecution and Punishment of Principal and Accessory (1931) 10
Neb. L. Bull. 170; Sears, Principal and Accessories, supra note 98.
101. It is a misdemeanor to solicit another to commit murder. Common-
wealth v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83, 23 At. 388, 28 Am. St. Rep. 782 (1891). It is
also a mere misdemeanor to solicit another to commit arson. State v. Bowers,
35 S.C. 262, 14 S.E. 488, 15 L.R.A. 199, 28 Am. St. Rep. 847 (1892). The same is
true of the solicitation to commit adultery. State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266, 18
Am. Dec. 105 (1828).
102. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 45, provides that all persons shall
be subject to punishment for the crime who participate in the perpetration
of the elements or give to the perpetrator such help and cooperation that
without it he would not have been able to commit the crime. The same pun-
ishment will be imposed upon those who have directly instigated another to
commit a crime. Art. 46 provides that those who contribute to the perpetra-
tion of the crime in another way or give subsequent help in compliance with
a previous promise will be punished with the penalty provided for the per-
petration of the crime, but diminished to a third.
103. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 48, provides that all those persons are
participants in the crime who take part in the conception, preparation, or
perpetration of the crime or render help or cooperation of any sort in conse-
quence of a previous, or in connection with a subsequent agreement, or who
directly induce a person to commit a crime.
104. Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 14, distinguishes between autores, com-
plices, and encubridores.
105. Necessary participation exists, when a crime cannot be committed
without the participation of another, e.g., bigamy, adultery, rape, incest. In
these instances, the problem often arises whether the "necessary participant"
can be punished.
106. Excessus mandati exists if the perpetrator exceeds the scope of the
crime which the instigator wanted to have committed. Agent provocateur is
a person who instigates another to commit a crime in order to catch him at
the stage of attempt and turn him over to the authorities. In this country,
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Conspiracy is a special crime in Argentina, 7 whereas the
codes of Mexico and Chile include it in their general parts."0 8
VII. MERGER AND CONTINUOUS CRIME
At common law, the doctrine of merger is extremely limited.
It is only where the same criminal act constitutes both a felony
and a misdemeanor that there is, in the absence of statutory
change or abrogation of the rule, a merger of the two offenses,
the misdemeanor being merged in the felony and the latter only
being punishable.0 9 This singular case of merger at common
law resulted from the fact that the procedure in felony and mis-
demeanor cases was different. 10 Thus, the common law treated
the problem of merger purely from a procedural angle. How-
ever, the problem of merger is not only a matter of procedure,
but also of substantive law. In the first place, there are a num-
ber of crimes which cannot be committed without the simultane-
ous commission of another crime.1 1 In addition, no crime can be
perpetrated without an attempt to commit it. Consequently, it
seems in these instances that there exists a "necessary merger of
crimes." 112 In such a case the delinquent should be indicted only
the practice of an agent provocateur is called "entrapment." It involves not
only the question whether the entrapping person is punishable, but also
whether the entrapped may be punished. See Beale, The Borderland of Lar-
ceny (1929) 6 Harv. L. Rev. 244; Comments (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 598, (1929)
2 So. Calif. L. Rev. 283, See also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct.
210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932).
107. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 232, provides: If a person partici-
pates as promoter or director in a conspiracy of two or more persons to
commit the crime of rebellion or sedition, he shall be punished with a fourth
of the penalty provided for the crime which was to be perpetrated; provided
that the conspiracy was discovered before it was carried out.
108. Mexican Criminal Code, Art. 14, provides that if several persons
participate in the realization of a crime and one of them commits a crime not
previously agreed upon, he shall be punished for it, unless (1) it does not
further the perpetration of the crime agreed upon; (2) it is not a necessary
or natural consequence of the crime agreed upon nor of the means used to
carry it out; (3) they did not know that another crime would be committed;(4) they were not present, when the other crime was committed, or they did
everything to prevent it, although they were present.
Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 8(2), provides that if two or more personsjoin to commit a crime, it is a punishable conspiracy only in those instances
in which the penal code declares it to be punishable.
109. United States v. Gardner, 42 Fed. 829 (N.D. N.Y. 1890); Elsey v.
State, 47 Ark. 572, 2 S.W. 337 (1886); People v. Richards, 1 Mich. 216, 51 Am.
Dec. 75 (1849).
110. Misdemeanants were allowed many privileges in making their de-
fense, such as full privilege of counsel, a copy of the indictment and a specialjury. See Rex v. Westbeer, 1 Leach C.C. 12, 2 Strange 1133 (1740); Graff v.
People, 208 Ill. 312, 70 N.E. 299 (1904); Clark & Marshall, op. cit. supra note
53, at 12, 13, § 6, n. 47.
111. Rape by force cannot be committed without assault and battery;
robbery cannot be committed without larceny.
112. It is recognized in common law that an attempt of crime merges in
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for that crime in which the other crimes are necessarily merged.
In other instances, where one and the same act incidentally in-
volves several crimes, it might be justifiable to say that poena ma-
jor absorbet minorem, in other words, that the penalty will be de-
termined according to that crime which entails the heaviest pun-
ishment possible.1 " The constitutional provision prohibiting double
jeopardy leads to the same result, if the prosecutor chooses the
most severe crime as the basis of his indictment. The difficulty in
distinguishing between one single and several distinct criminal
transactions (problem of identity) exists under the merger theory
as well as under the double jeopardy theory. 14
The problem of merger becomes even more difficult when the
accused commits several distinct offenses. At common law, he
may be indicted and convicted for each separately since the prohi-
bition of double jeopardy does not apply."- If the trial judge ac-
tually orders him to serve the sentences on the several counts con-
secutively, he evidently would disregard the fact that the serving
6f two or more terms in a penitentiary results in more suffering
than each term of itself would create. In order to abolish the
hardship, it is necessary to find a measure for determining one
term for all the crimes committed.16 The device of'a concurrent
service of sentences also avoids the hardship. However, it is a
mere procedural device fully within the discretion of the trial
judge and is not reviewable."7
the completed offense. Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 55 N.E. 179, 47 L.R.A.
731 (1899). See also Sayre, supra note 83, at-73.
113. Schwenk, supra note 54.
114. See Comment (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 535. See also Thompson v.
State, 90 Tex. Cr. Rep. 222, 234 S.W. 400 (1921), holding that robbery of two
persons on one occasion constitutes two criminal transactions, noted in
(1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 615; State v. Mowser, 92 N.J. Law 474, 106 Atl. 416
(1919), holding that a conviction of robbery bars a conviction of homicide
which was committed as the result of violence in the perpetration of the
robbery, noted in (1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 110. See also Horack, The Multiple
Consequences of a Single Criminal Act (1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 805. Comments
(1931) 40 Yale L. J. 462, (1937) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79. Note (1938) 112 A.L.R.
983.
115. United States v. Hampden, 294 Fed. 345 (E.D. Mich. 1923); Hostetter
v. United States, 16 F.(2d) 921 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926); Gorsuch v. United States,
34 F.(2d) 279 (C.C.A. 6th, 1929); People v. Parker, 74 Cal. App. 540, 241 Pac.
401 (1925); State v. Augustine, 15 N.J. Misc. 401, 191 Atl. 805 (1937). The state
may also elect to prosecute for either offense. United States v. One Nash
Auto, 23 F.(2d) 126 (D.C. Mont. 1927); People v. Dillon, 199 Cal. 1, 248 Pac.
230 (1926).
116. One suggestion could be to fix first the penalty for each crime and
then to impose a penalty which is not less than the most severe of those
penalties.
117. United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 46 S.Ct. 156, 70 L.Ed. 802
(1926); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306
(1932). See also Comment (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 535.
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Although the common law recognizes the existence of certain
"continuing crimes, '""' it does not recognize in general the idea
that a series of crimes of the same nature, committed in the same
way and carried out upon one previously conceived intent, consti-
tutes one criminal transaction, so that an indictment for more than
one count would be subject to the plea of double jeopardy.119 The
theory has been advanced that if, for example, a servant decides
to steal daily one cigar out of the cigar box of his master and he
effectuates his intent for ten days, there is only one case of lar-
ceny instead of ten.12 0
The Criminal Code of Argentina applies the principle of
merger whenever several crimes are committed by one act.121 In
the event the perpetrator commits several distinct and separate
crimes, a measure is provided to avoid the hardship which results
from the accumulation of punishments.122 The Mexican code fol-
lows the same principles.12 Moreover, it recognizes the "continu-
ous crime.' 1 24 In Chile, the doctrine of merger applies when sev-
118. A continuing crime is one which consists of the continuance over a
period of time of a prohibited condition, for instance living in adultery or
fornication. Ordinarily, however, crimes against public morals need not be of
a continuous nature, and need not affect the public at large, but only such
as come in contact with it. See State v. Waymire, 52 Ore. 281, 97 Pac. 46, 21
L.R.A. (N.S.) 56, 132 Am. St. Rep. 699 (1908).
119. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923), holding
that each hand of play terminating in a distribution of winnings was a
"game" within the Kentucky statute. See Note (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 912.
120. Schwenk, supra note 54, at 564.
121. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 54, provides that if one act violates
more than one penal provision, only that provision is applicable that provides
for the more severe punishment. Art. 55 provides that if the accused commits
several crimes by different acts, the penalty will be fixed in the following
way: if the kind of punishment for all crimes is the same, then the minimum
punishment Is determined by the punishment of the most severe penalty and
the maximum punishment shall be the total of all penalties but not exceeding
the legal maximum amount of that kind of punishment as provided by the
code. Art. 56 provides that, if the kind of punishment for the different crimes
is different, the most severe punishment will be applied and the penalty will
be fixed under consideration of the minor crimes.
122. See note 121, supra.
123. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 64, provides that an accused who has
committed several crimes by different acts is punishable only for that one
crime which imposes the most severe punishment upon him. The penalty thus
found may be increased to the amount of the total of the penalties fixed for
each crime. In no event, however, may this penalty exceed thirty years of
prison.
Art. 19 provides that this method does not take place if the accused
committed a continuous crime or perpetrated one act which violates several
penal provisions.
Art. 19(2) defines a continuous crime as "an act or omission which has
been continued without interruption for a greater or less period of time."
124. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 19. See note 123, supra.
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eral crimes are committed by one act, but not when several crimes
are perpetrated by separate acts. 1 25
VIII. PENALTIES
The kind and extent of punishments depend largely upon the
purpose of punishment. According to more enlightened modem
thought, decisions of the courts, and teachings of penologists, the
humane policy is that the infliction of penalties for violation of
criminal laws is to be considered not as a punishment, but rather
as the reformation of the wayward and the protection of society.2 '
In other words, the theory of punitur quia peccatum est has yielded
to the theory of punitur ne peccetur. But even under the modern
theory there is enough room for a variety of punishments, as the
codes of Argentina, 127 Mexico,128 and Chile'29 show. It is a particu-
125. Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 74, provides that the accused must be
punished for each crime that he has committed. He must serve the penalties
simultaneously, if that is possible. If that is impossible, he must serve the
penalties in the order prescribed by the code. However, an exception exists
in the event the crime was committed as a necessary means for the commis-
sion of another crime or in the event that one single act constitutes two or
more crimes. Here, Art. 65 provides that the penalty shall be determined by
that criminal provision which imposes the severest punishment.
126. Glueck, Criminal and Justice (1936) 212, 213, contains the state-
ments: "Society should utilize every scientific instrumentality for self-protec-
tion against destructive elements in its midst with as little interference with
the free life of its members as is consistent with such protection and with a
recognition of its responsibility to aid the offending member in every way
that gives reasonable promise of his reform and rehabilitation." On page 216:
"Punishment in modern criminal law still contains too much of the vindic-
tive element." On page 218, the author suggests: "the criminal law must be
so framed as to reduce to a minimum the area of vindictive punishment."
See also Howard v. State, 28 Ariz. 433, 237 Pac. 203, 40 A.L.R. 1275 (1925); Ex
Parte France, 38 Idaho 627, 224 Pac. 433 (1924); Aabel v. State, 86 Neb. 711,
126 N.W. 316, 126 Am. St. Rep. 719 (1910).
It was also stated in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262
(1884), that the great end of punishment is not the expiation or atonement
of the offense committed, but the prevention of future offenses of the same
kind. See also Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1928) 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 453.
127. The Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 5, enumerates the following as
penalties: penitentiary, jail, fine, and disqualification. A sentence to peni-
tentiary for more than three years carries with it general political disquali-
fication for the period of punishment or for three more years, if the court
thinks it fit (Art. 12). It also means loss of the patria potestas during the ser-
vice of sentence, loss of the right ,to take of property or to dispose of it inter
vivos (Art. 12). The convict is subject to a curatorship as provided by the
Civil Code for incapable persons (Art. 12). The code distinguishes between
consequences of general disqualifications (loss of public office and of suffrage,
incapacity to obtain public offices or commissions and loss of pension), and
of special disqualification (loss of employment, office, profession, and inca-
pacity to obtain another) (Arts. 11, 19, 20). The code also provides for con-
ditional conviction, reparation of damages and conditional release from
prison. In case of sentence to penitentiary or jail for not more than two
years, or to fine, the tribunal may order in its judgment that the service of
the sentence, payment of the fine, shall be suspended. Whether or not it will
do so depends upon the moral personality of the accused, the nature of the
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lar feature of all three codes that the convicted has to pay dam-
ages to the injured. 10 Each code contains detailed provisions re-
garding the recovery of damages."'
The common law does not bind the judge to consider certain
aggravating or mitigating circumstances in order to determine a
definite penalty. 8 2 It was Ferri in particular who suggested that.
a penal code should specify aggravating and extenuating circum-
stances which must be applied strictly by the judge in order to
find the concrete penalty.133 However, the value of such strict rules
has been questioned.8 4 The codes of Argentina and Mexico indi-
cate the circumstances to be considered in rather broad language,
whereas the code of Chile enumerates ten extenuating and nine-
teen aggravating circumstances.1385 In Argentina and Mexico, spe-
crime committed and other surrounding circumstances, which may throw
light upon the personality of the accused. The suspension does not affect the
reparation of damages or the payment of court fees (Arts. 26-29).
128. The Mexican Criminal Code enumerates seventeen sorts of "penalties
and means of precautions": (1) prison, (2) relegation, (3) confinement of in-
sane, deaf and dumb, degenerate persons, and drunkards, (4) confinement,
(5) prohibition to attend certain places, (6) pecuniary penalty, (7) confisca-
tion of the criminal instruments, (8) confiscation or destruction of dangerous
and noxious things, (9) admonition, (10) warning, (11) bond to prevent a
crime, (12) suspension or loss of rights, (13) dismissal or suspension from
functions or public offices, (14) special publication of the sentence, (15) super-
vision by the police, (16) suspension or dissolution of associations, (17) tute-
lary measures for minors (Art. 24). The pecuniary penalty consists of a fine
and the reparation of damages (Art. 29).
129. In the Criminal Code of Chile, the punishments for "crimes" are
capital punishment, perpetual penitentiary, perpetual jail, major penitentiary,
perpetual relegation, major arrest, major exile, major relegation, general and
perpetual ineligibility for public offices, etc. (Art. 21). The punishments for
"simple delicts" are minor penitentiary, minor jail, minor arrest, minor exile,
minor relegation, banishment, suspension of public offices and professional
licenses (Art. 21). The punishment for "misdemeanors" is prison (Art. 21).
In all instances, a fine may be imposed and the loss and confiscation of the
instruments and products of the crime may be ordered (Art. 21). In addition,
the convict is bound to pay the costs, damages and detriments which he has
caused by committing the crime (Art. 24).
130. See notes 127, 128, and 129, supra.
131. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 29; Criminal Code of Mexico, Arts.
30-35; Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 24.
132. It has been held that in hearing evidence in aggravation or mitiga-
tion of punishment, the court may hear such evidence as it deems necessary
and proper. People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R. 1199 (1931).
See also Note (1931) 77 A.L.R. 1211. An elaborate analysis of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances recognized by courts has been given by Hall,
Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 521, 761.
133. 1 Ferri, Relazione sul Progretto Preliminare Di Codice Penale Italiano
(1921) 153.
134. Glueck, supra note 126, at 466-481; Glueck, Indeterminate Sentence
and Parole in the Federal System: Some Comments on a Proposal (1941) 21
B.U.L. Rev. 20; Glueck, 500 Criminal Careers (1930) c. II.
135. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 40, provides that the court will
determine the penalty according to Art. 41. The court must take into con-
sideration (1) the nature of the act, the means used as well as the extent of
the damage and the danger produced by the commission of the crime; (2) age,
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cial punishment is provided for the recidivist, 13 6 and in Mexico,
for the habitual criminal."'
IX. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXTINGUISH CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Circumstances which exclude criminal responsibility (either
the illegality of the act, or the culpability of the perpetrator) are
clearly distinguishable from those which extinguish it. If a cir-
cumstance exists which excludes criminal responsibility, no crime
comes into existence. A circumstance which extinguishes crim-
inal responsibility presupposes that a punishable crime has been
committed, but precludes punishments. The grounds for the ex-
tinction of criminal responsibility are substantially the same in
all three codes. 138 There are, however, various methods to deter-'
mine the period of prescription. In Argentina, the period depends
on the character of the penalty which has to be imposed for the
commission of the particular crime; 13 9 in Mexico, the period of
prescription is determined by the abstract punishment provided
for the particular crime;'40 and in Chile, a definite period of pre-
scription is provided.' In addition to the prescription of the crim-
education, habits, conduct, motives, impossibility or difficulty to make a living
for himself or his family, previous crimes and other preceding circumstances,
personal conditions, personal relations, time, place, mode and occasion of the
crime. Criminal Code of Mexico, Arts. 51, 52 are similarly phrased. Criminal
Code of Chile, Arts. 11, 12, 13, 62, 64.
136. Criminal Code of Argentina, Arts. 50-53; Criminal Code of Mexico,
Arts. 20-23, 65.
137. Criminal Code of Mexico, Arts. 21, 66.
138. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 59, provides that the penal action
is extinguished by death, amnesty, prescription and by waiver, whenever
the crime is of private nature. Art. 65 provides that even the sentence may
prescribe. Arts. 69 and 73 provide that the subsequent consent of the injured
will extinguish the penal responsibility for crimes of private nature: namely,
adultery, slander, violation of secrets and unfair competition.
Criminal Code of Mexico, Arts. 91-118, provide that the Criminal responsi-
'bility shall be extinguished by death (Art. 91), amnesty (Art. 92), pardon and
consent of the injured (Art. 93), indulgence ("indulto," Arts. 94-98), and pre-
scription (Arts. 100-118).
Criminal Code of Chile, Art. 93, provides that the penal responsibility
shall be extinguished by death, service of the sentence, amnesty, indulgence,
pardon of the injured as to those crimes which must be prosecuted by private
action, prescription of the penal action, and prescription of the penalty (I. e.,
sentence).
139. Criminal Code of Argentina, Art. 62, provides for a prescription
within 20, 5, 2, or 1 year, according to the punishment which the code pro-
vides for the commission of the particular crime. Art. 65 provides for the pre-
scription of the sentence.
140. Criminal Code of Mexico, Art. 104, provides that a crime prescribes
in one year, if it deserves only a fine. If it deserves corporal punishment, it
prescribes within a period which Is equal to the period of punishment, but
not less than three years (Art. 105). The period of punishment shall be
determined by the arithmetical middle of the period running from the mini-
mum to the maximum punishment (Art. 118).
141. Criminal Code of Chile, Arts. 94-97, provide for a prescription of the
penal action on the one hand and of the sentence on the other. "Crimes" for
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inal action, Argentina and Chile provide that, if the service of the
sentence is not commenced within a certain period of time, the
liability of serving it is ended by prescription.1 42
CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the Chilean Criminal Code in 1874,
the ideas of basic principles of criminal law have changed. The
doctrine of punitur quia peccatum est has given way to that of
punitur ne peccetur. Consequently, not the crime, but the crim-
inal has been made the focus of the trial. No wonder that a new
criminal code has been proposed for Chile by the Ministry of Jus-
tice.143 It provides for the abolishment of those penalties which
are inconsistent with the modern purpose of punishment. 4 4 It also
abolishes the enumeration of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances' 4 and introduces the indeterminate sentence.,46 The
concept of the frustrated delict has been given up in view of the
fact that a frustrated delict is nothing but an attempted crime.147
Finally, the accessory after the fact is no longer a participant in
the crime of the perpetrator, but is guilty of a separate and lesser
offense dealt with in the special part of the proposed code.1 48
Though the Criminal Code of Argentina is of rather recent
date, it obviously has not satisfied the expectations which were
set in it. By Decree of September 19, 1936, Jorge E. Coll and
Euseblio G6mez were charged with the draft of a new criminal
code. On July 8, 1937, they submitted it to the Minister of Justice
and Public Instruction." 9 The geiieral part of the draft is com-
posed of ten titles, which are these: (1) Application of the Code,
(2) The Crime, (3) The Criminal, (4) Minors, (5) Sanctions,, (6)
Imposing Sanctions, (7) Conditional Pardon, (8) Reparation of
Damages, (9) Prosecutions (public, private, and on demand),
(10) Prescription of Crimes and Sentences. The draft is, like that
of Chile, based upon the theory that the criminal, not the crime,
which the capital punishment or perpetual penitentiary, jail or relegation
must be imposed prescribe within twenty years, other "crimes" prescribe
within fifteen years. "Simple delicts" prescribe within ten years, and "misde-
meanors" prescribe within six months. The penalty prescribes in twenty, fif-
teen, ten years, or six months, depending on whether it was imposed for a
"crime," "simple delict," or "misdemeanor."
142. See notes 138 and 141, supra.
143. Ministerio de Justicia, Proyecto de C6digo Penal (1929).
144. Id. at VI.
145. Id. at XIII.
146. Id. at VII-X.
147. Id. at XV.
148. Id. at XIII-XIV.
149. Ministerio de Justicia e Instruccion Publica, Proyecto de C6digo
Penal para la Republica Argentina (1937).
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shall be punished. The draftsmen conclude the report of their
motives with a statement, the realization of which seems to be as
important as any new codification: the effectiveness of the new
code will depend on two conditions, on the adequate equipment of
the penal institutions and the qualification of those authorities
who are in charge of the criminal.15
150. Id. at IX, X.
